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We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode 
of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics 
of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative 
design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule “imitate the best.” In a redistribution 
game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the 
outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-
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Over the last ﬁfteen years, a new mode of governance has emerged within the European
Union (EU). Since the European Council summit in Lisbon (March 2000), it has been
coined the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). Initially designed for, and applied in,
social policy (social inclusion, health care, pensions and long-term care), various European
Councils approved of the extension of the OMC to a broad spectrum of policy areas,
encompassing, e.g., immigration, technology and environment.
The Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council1 deﬁne the OMC as “a means
of spreading best practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals.”
The OMC is best described as an iterative process of mutual learning and imitation among
governments.2
Roughly, the OMC proceeds as follows (see Figure 1 for a sketch): Having agreed on
EU-wide common objectives and indicators, EU member states individually design and
implement their national policies. After a certain period, these national strategies are
jointly evaluated and compared within the EU. Best practices are identiﬁed and member
states are encouraged (but not forced) to adopt them. The process is then iterated.
The OMC induces member states to systematically compare themselves to one another
in terms of their (relative) policy performance. It promotes the imitation of successful
policies, thus aiming at policy convergence (Trubek and Mosher, 2001). Diversity, though,
is not disallowed (Zeitlin, 2005; Daly, 2007). The OMC is a soft-law method, leaving to
member states control of their policies (Pochet, 2005), thus keeping agency costs and losses
in national sovereignty minimal (Borr´ as and Jacobsson, 2004). The rationale behind the
OMC is the hope that the quality of policy decisions improves and that policy-learning
through benchmarking is enhanced.
In this paper, we provide a theoretical model of the OMC and an assessment of its
performance in a social policy (redistribution) setting. Following the design depicted in
1Available at http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/mar2000/index.htm
2While the OMC still lacks a unique and precise deﬁnition, there seems to be a consensus
among its commentators that “learning” and “imitation of best practise” are core ingredients of the
method. Detailed information on the OMC in the area of social policy in the EU is available at
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Figure 1: The iterative OMC process.
Figure 1, we model the OMC as an iterative process with an emphasis on mimicking best
practices that, at the same time, allows for country-speciﬁc deviations. The resulting
political process exhibits evolutionary learning with imitation and experimentation. This
allows us to employ concepts and results from evolutionary game theory in the analysis of
the OMC. Speciﬁcally, we argue that the OMC leads to the emergence of evolutionarily
stable strategies (ESS). An ESS is a strategy which, once chosen by all players, cannot
be invaded by any competing alternative strategy. ESS are also the outcome of imitative
learning. For an iterated process like the OMC with its emphasis on copying best practices
evolutionary stability, thus, appears to be the appropriate solution concept.
In its most common usage, evolutionary game theory considers large populations of players
who are randomly matched to recurrently play some game. In that case, ESS are always
Nash equilibrium strategies.3 For the application in this paper, however, the number
of players (say, the now 27 governments of the EU member states) is far from inﬁnite.
Therefore, ﬁnite-population results have to be applied. With a small number of players,
3Moreover, they are asymptotically stable in the replicator dynamics (see, e.g., Weibull, 1995). The
replicator dynamics, in turn, can be justiﬁed on the basis of imitation of other randomly observed,
successful strategies (Bj¨ ornerstedt and Weibull, 1996). In this sense, a central contribution of evolutionary
game theory has been to show that boundedly rational behavior, like imitation, does not preclude the
emergence of Nash equilibrium and, thus, of rational outcomes in the aggregate.
3ESS is not necessarily a reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium. Rather, ESS can be interpreted
as Nash equilibrium strategies for a game deﬁned in relative (rather than absolute) payoﬀs
(see Schaﬀer, 1988). This makes the concept suitable for the analysis of the OMC, where
policy adoption is recommended on the basis of governments’ relative performance. The
tension between ﬁnite-population ESS and Nash equilibrium will not show up in our
model. In Section 3 we will show that all ESS of our model are indeed Nash equilibria of
the game.4
We do want to stress the importance of the strategic eﬀects arising in a setting with a ﬁnite
number of players. In our analysis we compare the ESS resulting from the OMC to Nash
equilibria and co-operative solutions of the policy competition game. These two solution
concepts represent the traditional modes of governance in the EU: they are the outcomes
when, respectively, policies remain fully decentralized (ﬁscal competition) or are fully
coordinated (integration or community method). In general, all these concepts diﬀer in
the presence of payoﬀ externalities (in our model: ﬁscal externalities). It therefore makes
sense to put the OMC into an explicitly game-theoretic context, even though the literature
on the OMC hardly ever mentions strategic interdependencies as a relevant impact factor
on the method’s performance.5 Our main result will be that the ESS coming out of the
OMC are indeed a subset of the set of Nash equilibria. However, we will ﬁnd no general
logical nexus between ESS and eﬃciency.
More speciﬁcally, we embed the OMC into a standard game of redistribution from rich
to poor in a multi-country setting with labour mobility. As a stylized example of social
policy, this application seems reasonably close to the contexts for which the OMC was
originally designed. In our model, the poor beneﬁciaries of transfers are internationally
mobile and settle where the welfare state is most generous. Governments are inequality-
averse utilitarians and, thus, have a preference for redistribution. With decentralization,
transfer policies are best responses to the policies of other jurisdictions. The decentral-
4The relation between Nash equilibrium and ESS for ﬁnite populations has been explored by Ania
(2008) and Guse et al. (2008) and is still not fully understood.
5A few exceptions should be mentioned: Pestieau (2005) and Coelli et al. (2008) relate the OMC
to yardstick competition and its idea that information spill-overs would enable citizens to compare the
performance of their governments with that of goverments elsewhere and then to punish and reward
politicians. However, no formal analysis is provided. B¨ uchs (2008) informally analyzes the OMC as
a “two-level” (more precisely: two-stage) game where governments ﬁrst agree on objectives and then
implement policies to meet these objectives.
4ized redistribution game has a large set of Nash equilibria. With the OMC, however,
governments adopt imitative behavioral rules or, which turns out to be equivalent, choose
policies that perform best relative to what other governments do. Comparing the resulting
ESS with the Nash equilibria of the decentralized redistribution game, we ﬁnd in Section 3
that the former are a strict subset of the latter. Hence, in our model the OMC cannot
achieve anything that could not also be obtained via a decentralized approach. However,
the OMC avoids some extreme outcomes that are possible under decentralization.
As our main contribution, we provide in Section 4 a dynamic approach that reﬂects the
iterative and imitative gist of the OMC as illustrated in Figure 1. For commonly agreed-
upon objectives (represented in the model by a social welfare function), governments
choose policies mimicking what was observed to be successful in previous periods; this
captures the idea of learning from other’s experience. The “open” nature of the OMC
process is modeled as experimentation: there is no binding commitment to adopt best
practices and countries are free to implement policies as they wish. We show that such a
process of imitation and experimentation indeed converges to an ESS. Not all ESS, how-
ever, are equally robust to experimentation. In particular, long-run equilibria come from
the “medium” range of ESS, resulting in a convergence towards moderate redistribution
policies where transfers to the poor are neither extremely low nor overly generous. Em-
pirically, a trend of convergence of social policies and the absence of a race-to-the-bottom
have been observed for OMC participants by Coelli et al. (2008). This ﬁts well to our
theoretical observations.
To summarize, our paper makes the following points. Models of learning and evolution in
games provide a suitable framework for an analysis of the OMC. Evolutionary stability
captures both the static (relative performance) and the dynamic features (learning pro-
cess) of the OMC. The imitative process of the OMC converges and settles at intermediate
transfer levels. However, we will illustrate how the OMC can result in underprovision as
well as in overprovision of redistribution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a game of decentralized
redistribution. Section 3 derives Nash equilibria and ESS for that game (static analysis).
Section 4 presents a formal analysis of the imitation dynamics induced by the OMC.
Section 5 discusses eﬃciency issues and some basic extensions of the model. Section 6
concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
52 The Model
2.1 Mobility and redistribution
There are n ≥ 2 identical countries that form an integrated economic area with free
mobility. Countries, indexed by i = 1,...,n, decide on whether and, if so, to what
degree to engage in redistribution among their residents. In each country there is one
very rich and immobile resident earning wR; this normalization to one rich per country
is innocuous in our framework. A large population of poor individuals, each earning
wP < wR, can beneﬁt from redistribution. Poor individuals are perfectly mobile and
decide where to establish their residence based on the generosity of social policy. Let
ν ≥ n be the total size of the population of poor individuals in the economic area. Each
individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor. Thus, labor supply and basic earnings
do not depend on social policy; this guarantees that the total size of the population of
individuals aﬀected by redistribution is constant.
We denote by ℓi (with 0 ≤ ℓi ≤ ν) the amount of mobile poor living in country i.
Redistribution from rich to poor is organized as follows. Each country i implements
a non-negative lump-sum transfer, si, payable to each poor within its jurisdiction and
ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax ti on its rich resident. Government budgets are required to
balance; i.e., the sum of transfers equals the amount of revenues raised:
si   ℓi = ti.
With such a redistribution scheme, consumption levels of the poor and the rich residing
in country i, respectively, amount to
c
P
i = wP + si and c
R
i = wR − ti = wR − ℓi   si.
The set of possible subsidies is restricted to S = [0,wR]. We henceforth write s =
(s1,...,sn) ∈ Sn for vectors of redistributive policies. It is convenient to use the notation
s = (si| s−i), where si is the subsidy chosen by country i and (with some abuse of notation)
s−i is the vector of subsidies chosen by countries other than country i or any permutation
thereof. Finally, denote si = max{s−i}; for any given i, si is the maximum subsidy chosen
by any country other than i.
Individuals care only about their consumption. Thus, mobile individuals establish their
residence in the country with the most generous redistribution policy. Given s = (si| s−i),
6denote by Mi(s−i) = {j  = i|sj = si} the set of countries oﬀering the highest subsidy when
we exclude i and let mi(s−i) = |Mi(s−i)| be its cardinality. Given a vector s of subsidies,
we denote the distribution of mobile poor by (ℓ1(s),...,ℓn(s)), where ℓi(s) denotes the
amount of poor residing in country i. Assume that whenever two countries, i and j,
choose the same transfer level, they attract the same amount of poor; i.e.
si = sj =⇒ ℓi(s) = ℓj(s).
As the mobile poor settle only in the most generous countries, their distribution across
countries follows the pattern in (1):




0 if si < si
ν
1+mi(s−i) if si = si
ν if si > si.
(1)
Clearly, 0 ≤ ℓi(s) ≤ ν and
 n
i=1 ℓi(s) = ν. Two observations about (1) will become
important later on. First, the fraction of the poor residing in country i is invariant to
permutations of other countries’ subsidies. Second, so expressed, ℓ(si| s−i) is also the
amount of poor that would reside in any country (not only i) choosing s = si when all
other countries choose subsidies according to s−i.
We postulate our model in terms of governments choosing subsidies that attract mobile
poor. This is in line with models by Wildasin (1991, 1994), Cremer and Pestieau (2003),
and many others. Alternatively, we could have chosen to make poor individuals immobile,
let rich individuals be mobile, and governments choose taxes instead of subsidies. This
would not change the essence of our analysis.6 A potentially more critical modeling choice
is the assumption that all poor are mobile. In Section 5 we discuss the robustness of our
results to the introduction of some immobile poor. Due to costless mobility, migration
responses in our model are extremely sensitive and discontinuous: a slight change in
transfers might cause a complete reshuﬄing of the population in the economic area. This
assumption, which is similarly made in other papers (see, e.g., Cremer and Pestieau, 2003;
Kolmar, 2007), gives our approach a Bertrand-type ﬂavor. In a companion paper, Ania
and Wagener (2009) consider a model with smooth migration ﬂows.
6It is well-known, however, that results for decentralized redistribution change if both tax payers and
welfare recipients are mobile. See e.g. Leite-Monteiro (1997).
72.2 Policy objectives
At least since Mansoorian and Myers (1997), it is well-known that government objective
functions play an important role in decentralized redistribution games where population
sizes are endogenous (also see Cremer and Pestieau, 2004). We consider here utilitarian
governments that evaluate individuals’ utility derived from consumption by some utility
function, u(c), which is twice continuously diﬀerentiable and such that u′(c) > 0 > u′′(c)
for all c ≥ 0. We assume that u(wP) ≥ 0, and there exists K ≥ 0 such that u(0) < −K.
The government of any country i = 1,...,n assesses diﬀerent policies by comparing the
sum of the utilities of those currently living in i under such policies; i.e.
πi(s) = ℓi(s)   u(c
P
i ) + u(c
R
i ) = ℓi(s)   u(wP + si) + u(wR − ℓi(s)   si). (2)
The fact that ℓi(s) is invariant to permutations of other countries’ subsidies allows to
write payoﬀs also as:
πi(s) = π(si| s−i) = ℓ(si| s−i)   u(wP + si) + u(wR − ℓ(si| s−i)   si), (3)
where now π(si| s−i) is the payoﬀ to any country choosing s = si when all other countries
choose subsidies according to the vector s−i.
If all governments set identical transfers, the poor will be equally distributed across coun-













We refer to s0 as the eﬃcient symmetric solution; transfers s0 lead to an egalitarian
income distribution.
The objective function (2) is called generalized utilitarianism. In settings with variable
population sizes, it is one out of many utilitarian-type social welfare functions (Blackorby
et al., 2009). A serious ﬂaw of generalized utilitarianism is that it gives rise to the so
7To see this, ﬁrst observe that s0 is strictly positive since the objective function is strictly increasing
at s = 0 by strict concavity of u(c) and the fact that wP < wR. Moreover, s0 must satisfy the ﬁrst order
condition u′(wP + s0) = u′(wR − ν/n   s0) which gives the expression in the second line of (4); clearly
s0 < n/ν   wR, so that the rich is not completely expropriated in the symmetric eﬃcient allocation.
8called repugnant conclusion (Parﬁt, 1982; Blackorby et al., 2009) – for every population
of arbitrary well-oﬀs, there exists another, suitably larger population of paupers such that
utilitarians will strictly prefer the latter to the former. This substitutability of population
size for quality of life is ethically questionable. Obviously, the set of Nash equilibria, and
our results, depend crucially on the choice of objectives. Our focus here is on the workings
of the OMC given a particular type of objective function, which is meant to reﬂect the
common objectives and target indicators that member states agreed upon.
3 Static Analysis: Nash equilibria vs. ESS
The model presented in Section 2 deﬁnes a game where the players (countries i = 1,...,n)
simultaneously choose subsidies out of a common strategy set given by the feasible set
of subsidies S = [0,wR]. Migration decisions as summarized by expression (1) determine
the payoﬀs πi : Sn → R which are given by expression (2). The game is symmetric, since
payoﬀs can be written as πi(s) = π(si| s−i) shown in (3). Payoﬀs do not depend on the
players’ names and are invariant to permutations of other players’ strategies.
Before proceeding with the analysis, let us recall here the deﬁnitions of a symmetric Nash
equilibrium and a ﬁnite-population evolutionarily stable strategy and shortly comment on
the diﬀerence between the two concepts. By focusing directly on symmetric equilibria we
can write both deﬁnitions using the same notation.8





N) ≥ π(s| s
N,s
N,...,s
N) for all s ∈ S.




E) ≥ π(s| s
E,s
E,...,s
E) for all s ∈ S.
8Schaﬀer (1988) gives a deﬁnition of evolutionary stability for a ﬁnite population of N individuals
who are randomly matched to play an n-person game. We take here Schaﬀer’s deﬁnition for the case of
n = N. See also Vega-Redondo (1996, pp. 31-33) for a discussion of this concept. See Crawford (1991)
and Tanaka (2000) for closely related concepts. See Nowak et al. (2004) for a recent dynamic concept of
evolutionary stability for ﬁnite populations.
9We say that a Nash equilibrium or an ESS is strict if the corresponding inequality holds
strictly for all s′  = s.
In a Nash equilibrium no player would strictly beneﬁt from a deviation, given what other
players are doing. In an evolutionarily stable proﬁle no player would be able to gain a
strict relative advantage by deviating. Note that for a Nash equilibrium we compare the
deviator’s payoﬀs before and after deviation. In an evolutionarily stable proﬁle, instead,
we compare payoﬀs to the deviator, choosing s, with payoﬀs to the non-deviators, choosing
sE, after a unilateral deviation. For this reason, when the population is ﬁnite and each
player has a non-negligible impact on the payoﬀs of all other players, it may pay in relative
terms to deviate from a Nash equilibrium, if the loss imposed on non-deviators is bigger
than the loss suﬀered by the deviators themselves. This is referred to as spiteful behavior
(Hamilton, 1970).9
Before we characterize the Nash equilibria and the ESS of the game, let us introduce the











where k ∈ {1,...,n}. The value of f(k,s) can be interpreted as the payoﬀ to any
of k countries equally sharing all the poor at subsidy level s, of course provided they
attract the poor with that subsidy (i.e. s is currently the maximum subsidy). Note that
f(k,0) ≥ u(wR). By the strict concavity of u(c) and since wP < wR, we get that f(k,s)





The properties of f guarantee that s∗(k) is strictly positive for all k and it must satisfy













9Such considerations would not play a role in a continuum population, since each player has a negligible
impact on the payoﬀs of others in that case. It is well known that ESS are always Nash equilibrium





s∗(1) s(n) ˆ s(1) ˆ s(2) ˆ s( n
2 ) ˆ s(n − 2) ˆ s(n − 1) ˆ s(n)
Figure 2: Properties of auxiliary welfare functions f(k,s).
Given that k countries share the burden of redistribution, they maximize social welfare
by choosing s = s∗(k). Clearly, 0 < s∗(k) < k/ν   wR is increasing in k; i.e., social policy
should optimally be more generous as more countries engage in redistribution.
Given any k ∈ {1,...,n}, deﬁne   s(k) as the strictly positive value of s that solves
f(k,  s(k)) = u(wR),
and ¯ s(k) as the strictly positive value that solves
f(k, ¯ s(k)) = f(1, ¯ s(k)).
At   s(k), a country is indiﬀerent between paying transfers   s(k) to ν/k poor and not at-
tracting any poor at all. At ¯ s(k), a country is indiﬀerent between paying transfers ¯ s(k)
to ν/k poor and, at the same transfer, hosting all poor. In Appendix A we show that the
family of functions {f(k,s)}k=1,...,n and the corresponding values of   s(k) and ¯ s(k) have
the properties depicted in Figure 2.10 In particular, we show that
s
∗(1) < ¯ s(2) < ¯ s(3) < ... < ¯ s(n) <   s(1) <   s(2) < ... <   s(n). (5)
10Our game has a structure akin to that of an oligopolistic market of the type analyzed by Dastidar
(1995), where ﬁrms have decreasing returns to scale and compete in prices.
11This observation allows an easy characterization of Nash equilibria and ESS. We ﬁrst
show that our game has a large set of symmetric, pure-strategy Nash equilibria:
Proposition 1 Under generalized utilitarianism the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria
is given by
Σ
N = {s = (s,...,s) | ¯ s(n) ≤ s ≤   s(n)}.
Observe that transfer levels at Nash equilibria are quite generous; even overprovision of
transfers (i.e., values of sN larger than s0 = s∗(n)) is possible in a Nash equilibrium.
This is in contrast with the widespread fear of an erosion of the welfare state due to
migration pressures (Cremer and Pestieau, 2004). It is a consequence of the government
objective which entails a strong preference for large population sizes (recall the repugnant
conclusion). Hence, the widely feared demise of the welfare state does not occur in our
model (see Secton 5 for modiﬁcations).
Our next proposition characterizes the set of ESS. It shows that ESS are a strict subset
of the set of Nash equilibrium strategies found in Proposition 1:
Proposition 2 Under generalized utilitarianism the set of ESS is the interval
S
E = [  s(1),  s(n − 1)].
Proposition 2 conveys that whatever can be achieved at an ESS could also be achieved
through decentralization at a Nash equilibrium. The set of ESS, however, is a strict subset
of the set of Nash equilibria, precluding some extremely low and extremely high subsidies
that can be rationalized as a Nash equilibrium. In particular, for s ∈ [¯ s(n),  s(1)), subsidies
are still too low and a single country could still achieve a relative advantage through more
redistribution even if it attracted all poor. The situation with s ∈ (  s(n − 1),  s(n)] is also
too unstable; if a single country were to lower its subsidy, all others would be left with
too high subsidies given the number of countries sharing the burden of redistribution.
It is worth pointing out special properties of the two extreme values in the interval SE.
Starting at the symmetric proﬁle where all countries set s =   s(n − 1), a deviation down-
wards to some s′ < s =   s(n − 1) would result in a relocation of all poor among the
remaining n − 1 non-deviating countries; their payoﬀ, however, would be exactly u(wR)
12by deﬁnition of   s(n−1) and the deviator would have no strict disadvantage. This cannot
happen with any other ESS in the interval SE — from any other ESS a deviator would
suﬀer a strict disadvantage. All ESS in the interval are strict except the upper boundary
  s(n − 1), which is ESS, but it is not strict. This will make a subtle diﬀerence in the
dynamics analysis below.
4 The OMC as a Dynamic Imitative Process
In the present section we come to what we consider is the spirit of the OMC. We now
explicitly take a dynamic approach, allowing countries to observe each others’ subsidies
and welfare levels and to make sequential decisions based on this information. We assume
that countries tend to adopt subsidy levels associated with the highest welfare levels cur-
rently observed. Occasionally, countries can experiment with random subsidies. However,
such experiments are followed by other countries only when they prove to be successful
compared to other currently observed subsidy levels and will not persist otherwise. The
model intends to capture the main features of the OMC as stated by the European Com-
mission (see Figure 1 again). In our model, the (symmetric) welfare function stands for
the commonly agreed-upon objectives; subsidies are the policy instrument and each pe-
riod welfare levels constitute the target indicator that is reported by each country. Our
imitation dynamics intends to capture the iterative loop by which countries learn from
each other’s experience. Finally, experimentation captures the open nature of the process;
namely, the most successful policies observed and the recommendations of the Commis-
sion are not binding – countries are allowed to adopt other policies based on their own
motivations to do so, which may range from mistakes to national political interests. We
now proceed to introduce and analyze the dynamic model.
The analysis is applied to a discretized version of the model presented in Section 3.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that countries choose subsidies from a ﬁnite set Γ ⊂ S. For
simplicity of exposition, we assume that Γ contains the values   s(k) for all k = 1,...,n.11
The state space of the process is Γn, the state at t = 1,2,... is given by the vector of
subsidies chosen by all countries at t denoted
s(t) = (s1(t),...,sn(t)).
11Note that this assumption may preclude Γ from being a regular grid.
13Subsidies at t determine welfare levels given by the vector
π (s(t)) = (π1 (s(t)),...,πn (s(t))),
where πi (s(t)) is the welfare attained by country i in state s(t) and is deﬁned as in
expression (2) in Section 3. In any period t = 1,2,... all countries observe s(t) and the
vector π(s(t)). Given any s(t), deﬁne the set
B(s(t)) = {s ∈ Γ | s = si(t) for some i and πi(s(t)) ≥ πj(s(t)) for all j}.
The set B(s(t)) contains all subsidy levels that have earned highest welfare in period t.
At the end of every t each country has a probability 0 < λ < 1 of revising its subsidy for
the next period. In doing so, it chooses any s ∈ B(s(t)) with positive probability. With
probability 1−λ this kind of imitative revision does not take place; this may reﬂect some
inertia in observing the system or in revising subsidies, due for example to restrictions
in the administrative or political decision-making process that are left out of our model.
Regardless of the results of imitation or inertia, at any point in time, each country has
probability 0 ≤ ε < 1 to experiment with any subsidy s ∈ Γ at random. Both, revision
and experimentation opportunities, are drawn independently across countries. Given λ
and ε, let P
λ,ε
s,s′ be the probability of a direct transition of the process from state s to state









We refer to the process with ε = 0 as the unperturbed imitation dynamics. A state s
that is reached with positive probability with P λ,0 but cannot be abandoned without
experimentation (i.e. P
λ,0
ss′ = 0 for all s′  = s) is called an absorbing state of the unperturbed
dynamics. An obvious property of imitation is that it leads to monomorphic states – in
our setup, states where all countries choose the same subsidy level. Deﬁne
M = {s ∈ Γ
n | s = (s,...,s), s ∈ Γ}.
From any s(t)  ∈ M there is positive probability that all countries revise their subsidies in
the same period and that they all choose the same s ∈ B(s(t)), reaching a monomorphic
state. At such a monomorphic state with an identical subsidy for all countries, the set
of best-performing strategies B simply consists of that subsidy, so imitation alone cannot
take the system out of a monomorphic state. This gives us
14Lemma 1 The set M of monomorphic states is the set of absorbing states of the unper-
turbed imitation dynamics P λ,0.
With experimentation, i.e., for ε > 0, however, there is positive probability to exit every
state and the model presents permanent randomness. The following features of the model
make the Markov process well behaved. First, there is positive probability (no matter how
small) that any subset of countries experiment simultaneously and that they experiment
with any subsidy so that P
λ,ε
ss′ > 0 for all s,s′ ∈ Γn and the process is irreducible. Moreover,
at any given period there is also positive probability that no country revises its subsidy
due to inertia (λ,ε < 1) and the process stays at the same state for one period; i.e.,
P λ,ε
ss > 0 for all s. This implies that the Markov process is aperiodic. For every λ and ε,








which satisﬁes  λ,ε =  λ,εP λ,ε, where  λ,ε (s) gives both, the probability that the system
is at any state s ∈ Γn in the long run as well as the average frequency with which the
process visits any state s ∈ Γn along any sample path.
Following the literature on stochastic evolutionary learning models, the analysis in this
paper focusses on the limit invariant distribution  λ = limε→0 λ,ε. States with positive
probability in  λ are called stochastically stable (alternatively, long-run equilibria). These
are the states that we would observe almost always as the probability of experimentation
approaches zero. This distribution exists, and it is a fundamental result in this literature
that it only gives positive probability to absorbing sets of the unperturbed dynamics – in
our case singleton monomorphic states. Henceforth, we focus the analysis on the set M
from Lemma 1 – only monomorphic states are candidates to be observed in the long run
as the probability of experimentation becomes small.12 The formal proofs are relegated to
Appendix C. Here, we provide an intuitive explanation of our main result which appears
in Proposition 4 at the end of this section.
Deﬁne by
E = {s ∈ M |   s(1) ≤ s <   s(n − 1)}
12The seminal papers in this literature are Foster and Young (1990), Young (1993), and Kandori et
al. (1993). Ellison (2000) gives an alternative characterization of stochastically stable states using the
concepts of radius and (modiﬁed) coradius. Our analysis relates also to N¨ oldeke and Samuelson (1993)
and Samuelson (1994) and their concepts of adjacent states and mutation-connected component.
15the subset of monomorphic states in which all countries choose a subsidy that is strict ESS;
E corresponds essentially to the interval SE from Proposition 2 above. From a state in
E, a single country experimenting with a diﬀerent subsidy would perform strictly worse
and will not be followed by imitation. I.e., states in E cannot be abandoned after a single
experimentation. All other states, however, can be abandoned after a single experiment.
It is always possible to do this in favor of some subsidy in the interval SE. To see this,
recall that   s(k) is the subsidy at which k countries sharing all the poor would attain social
welfare exactly equal to u(wR); for lower (higher) subsidies their welfare would be strictly
higher (lower) than u(wR). Now suppose the process is currently at a monomorphic state
with s <   s(1) and consider a deviation to   s(1). The deviating country will be the only
one actively performing redistribution but will attain welfare level exactly equal to u(wR).
Both the deviator and non-deviators are equally successful. Thus, at the next opportunity
for revision there is a positive probability to follow the deviator by imitation. The case
of high subsidies is even stronger. Suppose the process is currently at a state where all
countries set subsidy s >   s(n−1). If a single country lowers its subsidy (e.g. to any subsidy
in the interval SE), the welfare of the remaining n − 1 non-deviating countries will fall
below u(wR) and the deviator will be followed. Finally, note that   s(n−1) is excluded from
E. Starting at the monomorphic state where all countries choose s =   s(n−1), if a single
country lowers its subsidy (discontinuing its redistribution policy), both the deviator and
the non-deviators are equally successful and there is positive probability that the deviator
will be followed. These arguments show that E can be reached from outside if a single
country experiments with a subsidy that is a strict ESS, but E cannot be abandoned with
a single experiment. This makes it more likely that the process moves into the set E than
that it moves out.13 Recall from Section 3 that the interval SE is itself a subset of the set
of strategies played in any Nash equilibrium. Our prediction, summarized in the following
proposition, is that we always end up in E and thus always in the set of Nash equilibria.
Proposition 3 If s∗ is stochastically stable, then s∗ ∈ E ⊂ ΣN.
By deﬁnition of strict ESS, single experiments will not be enough to move the process
from one state to another within the set E. Yet it is possible to abandon states in E
after the simultaneous deviation of several experimenting countries. We will argue that
the number of simultaneous experiments needed to disturb states in E increases as we
13In the terminology of Ellison (2000), the set E has coradius 1 and radius strictly larger than 1. Thus,
stochastically stable states must be contained in E.
16move towards intermediate levels of the subsidy.14 To see this, we partition the set E into
subintervals
E
k = {s ∈ M |   s(k − 1) ≤ s <   s(k)}, k = 2,...,n − 1.
States in Ek are monomorphic with subsidies in the interval [  s(k − 1),  s(k)). It is also
convenient to introduce some notation for monomorphic states with subsidy equal to   s(k),
which must often be treated separately in our analysis. Let
s
k = (  s(k),...,  s(k)).
Except for the lower bound of the interval, these subsidies could be proﬁtably sustained
with at least k countries, where proﬁtably means here with welfare higher than or equal
to u(wR). Instead, if less than k countries actively engaging in redistribution set a subsidy
in (  s(k − 1),  s(k)), welfare will fall below u(wR). Although in our partition state sk is an
element of Ek+1, the same applies to subsidy   s(k).
• Moving from lower to higher subsidies.
Notice that the process will move away from state s1 and any other state in E2 if two
countries experiment with the same higher subsidy out of the interval (  s(1),  s(2)].
In particular, it is possible to go from any state in E2 to any other state in E2
with a strictly higher subsidy, or to reach state s2 in E3, with two simultaneous
experiments. Analogously, the process will move away from any state in E3 to any
other state in E3 with higher subsidy or to state s3 if three countries simultaneously
experiment with the same higher subsidy in (  s(2),  s(3)], and so on. In general,
given any pair s,s′ ∈ Ek with s < s′, state s′ can be reached from s if k countries
simultaneously experiment with s′. Moreover, state sk can always be reached from
any monomorphic state with lower subsidy if k countries simultaneously experiment
with   s(k). Coordinating on higher subsidies requires more and more countries as k
increases and, hence, transitions upwards become less likely the higher k.
14Underlying this is the fact that strategies in the interval SE display diﬀerent levels of so-called m-
stability (see Schaﬀer, 1988). A strategy is m-stable if it is robust to the simultaneous deviation of m
players to the same alternative strategy. A strategy is called globally stable if it is m-stable for all
m ∈ [1,n). Note that it is enough that n − m players experiment with a m-stable strategy to move the
system to that strategy, since players choosing the m-stable strategy perform better.
17• Moving from higher to lower subsidies.
Since migration takes place to countries with highest subsidies, experimenting with
lower subsidies means giving up redistribution policy and losing all poor. Experi-
mentation with lower subsidies can thus only be successful if the non-deviators are
left with welfare lower than or equal to u(wR). All subsidy levels associated to
states in En−1 can be sustained by n−1 countries with welfare strictly higher than
u(wR). Therefore, we would need at least two countries simultaneously lowering
their subsidies (in this case experimentation does not necessarily have to be with
the same subsidy) in order to move away from states in En−1. Analogously, we
would need three countries simultaneously lowering their subsidies to leave states
in Ek−2, and so on. In general, the process will move downwards from any state
in Ek if n − k + 1 countries lower their subsidies. Moving from more to less gen-
erous redistribution policies, that is from higher to lower subsidies, requires more
and more simultaneously experimenting countries the lower the starting subsidy is,
i.e.˙ for lower k. States with high subsidies are more likely to be disturbed in favor
of lower subsidies. At states with lower subsidies it becomes less likely to continue
with further lowering subsidies.
These ﬁndings can be roughly summarized as follows. From states in Ek with low k the
process is more likely to move upwards; for high k the process is more likely to move
downwards. Detailed accounting of these transition probabilities has to be done carefully
depending on whether n is odd or even and, in particular, for values of k around n/2.
This is done in the proof in Appendix C. In Figure 3 we illustrate the case of n odd –
the relevant case for the current EU-27.
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Figure 3: Most likely transition paths. The case of n odd.
The central interval for the case of n odd is E⌈n
2 ⌉. As Figure 3 shows, the lower and the




2 ⌉ it is then possible to move upwards with exactly ⌈n
2⌉ experiments
18up to the state s⌈n
2 ⌉ ∈ E⌈n
2 ⌉+1 which itself can be disturbed downwards with ⌈
n
2⌉ − 1
experiments (e.g., with n = 5 we need two deviations downwards to exit s3). Moving
downwards from any state in E⌈n
2 ⌉, including its lower bound, requires ⌈
n
2⌉ experiments
(with n = 5 we need three deviations downwards to exit s2). The process thus moves into
E⌈n
2 ⌉ with ⌈
n
2⌉ − 1 experiments and out of it with ⌈
n
2⌉ experiments. Within the set we
need the same experiments to move up and down. A typical path of this process is likely
to move into E⌈n
2 ⌉ eventually and then stay bouncing up and down in this set.15 Hence,
Proposition 4 The set of stochastically stable states is
i. E⌈
n





2} if n is even;
The main diﬀerence between the cases of odd and even n in Proposition 4 is that the
upper bound of the interval, s
n
2, can be included in the prediction in the case of n even.
This is because, in that case, n/2 experiments are enough to reach s
n
2 but also to exit it
downwards.
Proposition 4 shows that the most likely outcomes of the OMC applied to decentralized
redistribution lie in the intermediate range of the ESS. Intuitively, low subsidy levels can
be easily destabilized by a small number of countries coordinating with their experiments
on the same higher subsidy; high subsidy levels become unproﬁtable if only a small number
of countries cut their subsidies. Only the intermediate subsidies, which correspond to
intermediate values of the ESS are robust to such small-group experimentation.
The learning process of the OMC, thus, eschews ESS with very low or overly generous
support for the poor. A fortiori, since ESS are a subset of the set of Nash equilibria
in our model, the OMC also avoids potentially extreme states that could emerge in the
15The proof in Appendix C is done by showing that states s ∈ E⌈ n
2 ⌉ have minimum cost trees (see
e.g. Theorem 1 in Samuelson (1994)). The illustration above shows that, for the case of n odd, we could
alternatively use the radius-coradius theorem of Ellison (2000). However, we would need to resort to tree
surgery to show that all states in E⌈ n
2 ⌉ are stochastically stable. Also for even n there are many states
in the two central intervals with radius equal to their modiﬁed coradius. For these reasons and because
the set E⌈ n
2 ⌉ resembles what Samuelson (1994) calls a mutation-connected component it turns out to be
more convenient to compute transition costs.
19traditional setting of decentralized choice of redistribution policies. In that sense, the
learning process in the OMC can be viewed as a moderating device.
5 Discussion of the results
5.1 Eﬃciency
Given that, in general, an important motivation for policy coordination is the avoidance of
externality-induced eﬃciency failures of decentralization, it seems natural to ask whether
the learning process of the OMC indeed leads to eﬃcient policy outcomes. Formally, we
have to check for the relationship between the symmetric eﬃcient solution, s0, and the set
of stochastically stable states characterized in Proposition 4. Intuitively, s0 = s∗(n) max-













relevant to deﬁne E⌈
n
2⌉, refer to properties of the functions f(n−1
2 ,s) and f(n
2,s). Tech-
nically, there is no good reason why s0 should be related to our prediction in the set
E⌈
n
2⌉. Indeed, it is possible to construct examples where the eﬃcient outcome is in our
prediction. In general, however, the predictions of our model entail subsidies which could
be higher or lower than the eﬃcient outcome. This is illustrated in Example 1 bellow. It
should still be stressed that the convergence to “intermediate” subsidy levels precludes the
more extreme outcomes that could emerge under decentralization in a Nash equilibrium.
Example 1 Consider a utility function of the form u(x) =
√
x − 1. Take wP = 1 and
assume that wR ≤ 4. We have that














Take n = 10, in which case our prediction is always the interval (  s(4),  s(5)). Table 1
summarizes our results for diﬀerent values of wR and ν. We see that the eﬃcient out-
come, s0, may always be lower than   s(4), in which case we would predict ineﬃciently high
redistribution; it may be always higher that   s(5), in which case we would predict ineﬃ-
ciently low redistribution; ﬁnally, the eﬃcient outcome may some times be contained in
our prediction.




















Table 1: Eﬃciency results
5.2 Mobility of the poor
Let us now brieﬂy discuss the implications of our assumption on perfect mobility of the
poor. We will argue that our qualitative results are robust to the introduction of a small
fraction of immobile poor in each country. Consider a small variation of our model, where
all countries have some ﬁxed amount β of immobile (native) poor. The parameter β
measures the relative mass of immobile poor to rich in any given country. Symmetry is
preserved if β is the same for all countries. Assume ν > nβ; that is the total amount
of immobile poor is smaller than the amount of mobile poor. All other features of our
model are as before. The total amount of poor living in country i is now given by
  ℓi(s) := β + ℓi(s), where ℓi(s) is determined as in (1). Governments are still assumed to
adhere to generalized utilitarianism. Thus, payoﬀs can be written as in expression (2) by
replacing ℓi(s) with   ℓi(s). Countries now always have an incentive to actively pursue some
transfer policy, at least for their native poor. If no mobile poor moves to country i; i.e., if
˜ ℓi = β, its government would set the transfer to maximize the following welfare function
g(β,s) = β   u(wP + s) + u(wR − βs).
Note that g(β,s) is a strictly concave function of s with g(β,0) > u(wR) and g′(β,0) > 0.






Our assumptions guarantee that g(β,s) has the same properties as our auxiliary functions
f(k,s), derived in Appendix A. Thus, for β < ν/n, we have that   s0 > s∗(n) = s0.
Intuitively, when the fraction of immobile poor is not too large, optimal transfer policy
can be more generous when a country only has to provide social policy for the native
immobile. Moreover, deﬁne   s as the value of the subsidy that satisﬁes g(β,  s) = u(wR).
This is the analogous to our previous   s(k), which we proved to be strictly increasing in k.
21Again, since β < ν/n, we have that   s >   s(n). An intuitive picture can be obtained from
Figure 2 by replacing the horizontal line at the value u(wR) by a humped g curve with the
same features as the f curves and cutting through u(wR) further to the right. The points
at which g(β,s) cuts trough f(1,k) and f(n − 1,s) will now be the boundaries of the
ESS interval. Note ﬁnally that g(β,  s(n − 1)) > u(wR) = f(n − 1,  s(n − 1)); analogously,
g(β,  s(1)) > u(wR) = f(1,  s(1)). This indicates that the bounds of the ESS interval will
be lower than for the case without immobile poor. All other elements of the analysis are
as before.
5.3 Average utilitarianism
Finally, we turn our attention to the welfare function. Obviously, payoﬀs and, thus, the
equilibria of our game depend crucially on the choice of welfare function (Mansoorian
and Myers, 1997). We discussed at the end of Section 2 that generalized utilitarianism,
given in expression (2), as a government objective has the drawback of allowing for the
repugnant conclusion. With decentralized redistribution, this strong predilection for large
population sizes leads to quite generous subsidies to the mobile poor – an observation that
is at odds with the widespread fear of a decline of the welfare state in the presence of labor
mobility. There exist social welfare functions that avoid the repugnant conclusion (for a
survey, see Blackorby et al., 2009). One alternative that has captured some attention is






  [ℓi(s)   u(wP + si) + u(wR − ℓi(s)   si)]. (6)
It can be easily checked that the symmetric eﬃcient solution under average utilitarianism
coincides with the one obtained for generalized utilitarianism, s0, given by expression (4).
However, average utilitarianism gives a large welfare weight to well-oﬀ people, providing
strong incentives to cut back transfers to the poor. This actually results in a remarkable
eﬃciency failure both in a Nash equilibrium and in an ESS.
To see this, note ﬁrst that for ℓi = 0, we have πAU
i = u(wR). Denote λi =
ℓi
1+ℓi. By strict
monotonicity and strict concavity of u we have that, for any ℓi > 0,
π
AU
i = λiu(wP + si) + (1 − λi)u(wR − ℓisi) <






22This implies that at any proﬁle with a subset of countries sharing the burden of redistri-
bution at some strictly positive subsidy level, there is an incentive to cut down transfers
(leading to ℓi = 0). The only Nash equilibrium will have all countries setting si = 0.
Expression (7) also shows that s = 0 is the only ESS of the game, since at any symmetric
proﬁle with s > 0 a relative advantage can be obtained by cutting down s; alternatively,
starting at the symmetric proﬁle with si = 0 for all i, any increase in s results in a rel-
ative disadvantage. Clearly, the imitative process of the OMC will also not deliver any
improvement over the ineﬃcient Nash equilibrium.
6 Conclusions
We propose to analyse the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which the EU has
adopted since its Lisbon Summit in 2000 for social policy and elsewhere, as a dynamic
stochastic learning process of the type studied in evolutionary game theory. The OMC is
based on the idea that, for certain commonly agreed policy objectives, national policies
emerge from a process where governments compare themselves to one another in terms
of policy performance, learn from each other, and imitate what they perceive as best
practices. If convergence occurs under the OMC, then not due to express legislation but
by the force of example.
We formalize and explore the workings of OMC for the particular case of income redistri-
bution in an integrated economic area with perfectly mobile social welfare beneﬁciaries.
Our main observation is that the OMC strongly favors coordination on a subset of Nash
equilibria. In a dynamic interpretation, the OMC results in a powerful equilibrium reﬁne-
ment. In particular, intermediate values of subsidies that can be sustained by coordination
of approximately half of the countries are the most likely ones to be observed in the long
run.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that provides a formal, game theoretic analysis
of the OMC. Both opponents and advocates of the OMC will, with good reason, argue
that our stylized analysis ignores many of the OMC’s advantages (e.g., the higher degree
of legitimacy), deﬁnes away a number of problems (e.g., the deﬁnition and measurement
of performance indicators, communication procedures etc.) and discusses the OMC in
an artiﬁcial setting (decentralized redistribution) to which it may not at all be suited.
23Notwithstanding these concerns, our analysis entails important messages for policy-makers
and mechanism designers in the EU where welfare and redistribution policies are still in
the domain of national governments. The hope that the OMC will “recalibrate” European
welfare states (Ferrera et al., 2000) seems justiﬁed. On a ﬁrst pass, the OMC does indeed
provide a successful way to attain policy coordination and to avoid extreme, undesirable
outcomes. This appears to be in line with preliminary empirical evidence compiled in
Coelli et al. (2008).
A Properties of the payoﬀ function
We show here the main properties of the family of functions {f(k,s)}k=1,...,n that are used




  u(wP + s) + u(wR − ν/k   s) k = 1,...,n.
Notice f(k,0) ≥ u(wR) and fs(k,0) = ν/k   (u′(wP) − u′(wR)) > 0, since u′′ < 0 and
wP < wR implies u′(wP) > u′(wR). Moreover, fss(k,s) < 0.16
















νwR and s∗(k) is strictly increasing with k.
Given k ∈ {1,...,n}, let   s(k) be a strictly positive value of s such that f(k,  s(k)) = u(wR).
The properties of f imply that f(k,s) > u(wR) for all s ∈ (0,s∗(k)]. By deﬁnition of s∗(k)
and fss < 0, f is strictly decreasing for all s > s∗(k). Moreover, for s = k










wR) + u(0) < u(wR)




νwR) is strictly decreasing with k.17 Let
16We adopt the conventional notation fi(k,s) =
∂f(k,s)
∂i and fij(k,s) =
∂fi(k,s)
∂j∂i with i,j = k,s.













24u(0) < −K := u(wR)−ν  u(wP +1/ν  wR) to obtain the desired inequality. This implies
existence and uniqueness of   s(k) for all k and it shows that s∗(k) <   s(k) < k
νwR. Finally,
we have that   s(k′) >   s(k) for all k,k′ ∈ {1,...,n} and k′ > k. To see this, note that, by













= u(wP + s). (8)
The right hand side of expressions (8) is strictly increasing and strictly concave with s
and it equals u(wP) for s = 0. For any k, Γ(k,0) = 0 ≤ u(wP) and Γ(k,s) is strictly










Furthermore, u′′ < 0 implies that Γs(k′,s) < Γs(k,s) for all s > 0 and k′ > k; i.e. the Γ
functions become ﬂatter with s as we increase k. Thus, Γ(k,s) > Γ(k′,s) for s > 0 and
k′ > k. It follows that   s(k′) >   s(k) for all k,k′ ∈ {1,...,n} and k′ > k.
Given k ∈ {1,...,n}, let ¯ s(k) be a strictly positive s such that f(k, ¯ s(k)) = f(1, ¯ s(k)).
We now proceed to show existence and uniqueness of ¯ s(k). To this purpose deﬁne






















{u(wP + s) − s   u
′(wR − ν   s)}. (10)
For s ≤ s∗(1) we have wP +s ≤ wR−ν s and, by u′′ < 0, then u′(wP +s) ≥ u′(wR−ν s).








{u(wP + s) − s   u






u(wP) ≥ 0. (11)
since, by strict concavity of u(c), u(wP + y) − yu′(wP + y) > u(wP) ≥ 0 for all y > 0.
18By strict concavity






ν   s   u′(wR − ν   s).
25The second inequality in (11) follows again from strict concavity of u (cf. Footnote 17).
This shows that ∆(k,s) > 0 for s ∈ (0,s∗(1)] and thus, if ¯ s(k) exists, we must have
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′(wP + s) − u
′(wR − νs)].




− u′(wR − νs) < 0 by u′′ < 0. Recall that
u′(wP + s) − u′(wR − νs) ≤ 0 for s ≥ s∗(1). Thus, ∆s(k,s) < 0 for all s ≥ s∗(1). Finally,
take s =   s(1). We know that s∗(1) <   s(1) <   s(k) for k > 1 and we have that
∆(k,  s(1)) = f(1,  s(1)) − f(k,  s(1)) = u(wR) − f(k,  s(1)) < 0. (12)
Existence and uniqueness of ¯ s(k) for all k > 1 follows. Furthermore, (11) and (12) also














− u(wR − νs)
 
= u(wP + s).
It is easy to check that strict concavity of u implies Ω(k,s) is strictly decreasing with k
and, thus, ¯ s(k) increases with k.
B Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1. We proceed in two steps.
Step 1: All Nash equilibria are symmetric.
Consider any non-symmetric proﬁle (s1,...,sn) with si  = sj for some i  = j. Without
loss of generality suppose si < sj. Country i attracts currently no poor and gets payoﬀ
u(wR). The payoﬀ to all countries currently choosing maximum subsidy can be expressed
as f(mi(s−i), ¯ si), where ¯ s := ¯ si is the current maximum subsidy and m := mi(s−i)
is the number of countries currently choosing maximum subsidy. If ¯ s >   s(m), then
f(m, ¯ s) < u(wR). This cannot be an equilibrium, since any of the countries currently
26choosing maximum subsidy could strictly increase its payoﬀs by lowering the subsidy,
thus attracting no poor. If, alternatively, ¯ s ≤   s(m), then f(m, ¯ s) ≥ u(wR). Since   s(m) <
  s(m + 1), we have that f(m + 1,¯ s) > u(wR). Thus, if country i would deviate from si
and choose ¯ s, it would strictly improve its payoﬀs.
Step 2: Characterization of Nash equilibria
Consider any symmetric proﬁle s = (s,...,s). Payoﬀs to all countries at s can be ex-
pressed as f(n,s).
(i) Suppose s < ¯ s(n). Then, by deﬁnition of ¯ s(n), f(1,s) > f(n,s); i.e. a single country
alone oﬀering subsidy s would attain strictly greater payoﬀs. By continuity, there
exists s′ such that s < s′ < ¯ s(n) where f(1,s′) > f(n,s). Thus, there are incentives
to deviate.
(ii) Suppose s >   s(n). Then, by deﬁnition of   s(n), f(n,s) < u(wR); i.e. the subsidy is
too generous and these countries would be better oﬀ by attracting no poor. Any
country could strictly improve by choosing s′ < s.
(iii) Suppose now that ¯ s(n) ≤ s ≤   s(n). By deﬁnition of ¯ s(n) we have f(n,s) ≥ f(1,s)
and by deﬁnition of   s(n) we have f(n,s) ≥ u(wR). Any country reducing the
subsidy would get payoﬀ u(wR) with no strict improvement. Any country increasing
the subsidy to s′ > s would get payoﬀ f(1,s′). Recall ¯ s(n) > s∗(1) and, thus,
f(1,s′) < f(1,s) ≤ f(n,s). Therefore, there are no incentives to deviate.
It follows from (i)-(iii) that [¯ s(n),  s(n)] is the interval of equilibrium subsidies.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider any symmetric proﬁle s = (s,...,s). Suppose a
single country deviates to some subsidy s′  = s. The relevant payoﬀs to characterize ESS
are now the payoﬀs obtained after deviation.
(i) Suppose ﬁrst s <   s(1). A deviation upwards with s < s′ <   s(1) gives payoﬀ
f(1,s′) > u(wR) for the deviator while all others get u(wR) after deviation. Thus,
it is possible to obtain a strict relative advantage and s <   s(1) is not ESS.
(ii) Consider now s >   s(n−1). A deviation downwards to any s′ < s gives the deviating
country payoﬀ u(wR). After deviation, non-deviators get payoﬀ f(n−1,s) < u(wR)
27by deﬁnition of   s(n−1). Thus, the deviator has a strict advantage and s >   s(n−1)
is not ESS.
(iii) Let now s ∈ [  s(1),  s(n − 1)]. Deviations to s′ < s ≤   s(n − 1) will earn payoﬀ
u(wR) while those countries sticking to s obtain f(n − 1,s) ≥ u(wR). Deviations
to s′ > s ≥   s(1) will earn the deviator a payoﬀ f(1,s′) < u(wR) while all others
get u(wR). Thus, it is not possible to attain a strict relative advantage through
deviation.
It follows from (i)-(iii) that only s ∈ [  s(1),  s(n − 1)] are ESS.
C Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1. From any s(t)  ∈ M there is positive probability that all countries
revise their subsidies at the same time and that they all choose the same s ∈ B(s(t)),
reaching a monomorphic state. At a monomorphic state s(t) = (s,...,s) ∈ M we have
that B(s(t)) = {s}, so imitation alone cannot take the system out of a monomorphic
state.
The support of the limit invariant distribution is contained in the set M of absorb-
ing monomorphic states (see, e.g., Samuelson, 1994, Theorem 1). We thus restrict the
mutation-counting analysis to states s ∈ M. Let s ∈ M be an absorbing state of P λ,0.
The basin of attraction of s is the set of states from which there is positive probability
that the unperturbed imitation dynamics moves the process to s in a ﬁnite number of
periods. Given P λ,ε, an s-tree on Γn, denoted h, is a collection of ordered pairs (s′,s′′),
or arrows from s′ to s′′, such that:
i.) For each s′ ∈ Γn, there is at most one arrow from s′ to any other s′′ ∈ Γn.
ii.) For each s′ ∈ M \ {s}, there is a sequence of pairs {(s′,s1),(s1,s2),...,(sm,s′′)}
with s′′ in the basin of attraction of s.
We denote H(s) the set of all possible s-trees. Let s′,s′′ ∈ Γn and deﬁne the cost of an
arrow from s′ to s′′, denoted c(s′,s′′), as the minimum number of experiments needed to
28get from s′ to s′′ in the following sense. Let d(s′,r) be the number of coordinates which







The cost of a sequence of pairs and the cost of an s-tree can be obtained as the sum of








the cost of a minimum-cost s-tree. An absorbing state s∗ is stochastically stable (i.e., s∗
is in the support of the limit invariant distribution) if and only if s∗ solves mins∈M C(s);
i.e. stochastically stable states have minimum-cost trees.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the set
E = {s ∈ M |   s(1) ≤ s <   s(n − 1)}.
Denote sk = (  s(k),...,  s(k)) with k = 1,...,n. Let us ﬁrst argue that for all s  ∈ E, there
exists s′ ∈ E such that C(s′) < C(s) and, thus, s  ∈ E cannot be stochastically stable.
Let s(t) = (s,...,s) ∈ M be state at which the process starts in period t and call
s′(t + 1) ∈ Γn the resulting state when one of the countries deviates to subsidy s′ ∈ Γ
in period t + 1 while the remaining n − 1 countries still choose s. Consider the following
cases separately:
(i) Suppose s <   s(1) and s′ =   s(1). The deviating country attracts all poor and gets
payoﬀ u(wR) by deﬁnition of   s(1). Non-deviating countries with lower subsidies
attract no poor and also get u(wR). It follows that B(s′(t + 1)) = {s,s′}.
(ii) Suppose s ≥   s(n − 1) and s′ ∈ [  s(1),  s(n − 1)) ∩ Γ. The deviating country with
lower subsidy attracts no poor and gets payoﬀ u(wR). The remaining n − 1 non-
deviating countries must now share all the poor at s ≥   s(n − 1) which results in
payoﬀ f(n−1,s) ≤ u(wR) by deﬁnition of   s(n−1). It follows that s′ ∈ B(s′(t+1)).
Both in (i) and (ii) there is positive probability that all countries revise their subsidies
and choose s′ at the end of t + 1.
29(iii) Suppose   s(1) ≤ s <   s(n−1). If s′ < s (deviation downwards), the deviating country
gets u(wR), while the remaining n − 1 non-deviating countries with s <   s(n − 1)
get payoﬀs f(n − 1,s) > u(wR) by deﬁnition of   s(n − 1). Alternatively, if s′ > s
(deviation upwards), the deviating country with s′ > s ≥   s(1) attracts all poor and
gets payoﬀs f(1,s′) < u(wR), while the non-deviating countries get u(wR). In both
cases s′  ∈ B(s′(t + 1)).
It follows from (i) and (ii) that one experimenting country is enough to move the process
from any s  ∈ E to some s′ ∈ E. By (iii), however, one experimenting country alone is
not enough to exit states s ∈ E. Now take any s ∈ M such that s <   s(1) and consider
any s-tree of minimum cost C(s). We can now construct an s1-tree of minimum cost in
the following way: connect s to s1 at cost c(s,s1) = 1 as described in (i) and remove the
arrow starting at s1; by (iii) we have that c(s1,s′) > 1 for all s′ so that we have reduced
the total cost of the tree and thus C(s) > C(s1). We can now proceed analogously with
any s ∈ M such that s ≥   s(n − 1) and any s′ ∈ E; by (ii) and (iii) C(s′) < C(s).
Proof of Proposition 4. Deﬁne the following partition of the set E
E
k = {s ∈ M |   s(k − 1) ≤ s <   s(k)} k = 2,...,n − 1.
States in Ek are monomorphic. Note, however, that all these subsidies could be proﬁtably
sustained with k countries, where proﬁtably means here with welfare higher than or equal
to u(wR). If less than k countries actively engaging in redistribution set a subsidy in
(  s(k − 1),  s(k)), welfare will fall strictly below u(wR). Although in our partition state sk
is an element of Ek+1, the same applies to subsidy   s(k). Analogously, state sk−1 ∈ Ek
but subsidy   s(k − 1) can be sustained with at least k − 1 countries. Denote I(n) the set
of central states given as follows:
(i) If n is odd, I(n) = E⌈
n
2⌉





We now proceed to prove the proposition in three steps. First, we compute the cost
of reaching (exiting) any state in E from (to) a lower and from a higher state. Then,
argueing as in the proof of Proposition 3, we show that for any state which does not
belong to the set I(n) of central states we can ﬁnd some state in I(n) with strictly lower
30cost trees. This shows that states which are not central cannot be stochastically stable.
Finally, we will argue that all states in I(n) have minimum-cost trees of equal costs. It
follows that all states in I(n) are stochastically stable.
Step 1: Transitions upwards are increasingly costly depending on the state to be reached.
Transition downwards are decreasingly costly depending on the state we want to exit.
Let the process start at s(t) ∈ Ek in period t and denote s′(t + 1) ∈ Γn the resulting
state after deviation. Consider the following cases separately:
(i) Suppose s′(t + 1) has k′ countries choosing s′ > s with   s(k′ − 1) < s′ ≤   s(k′) and
k′ ≥ k. Deviating countries get payoﬀ f(k′,s′) ≥ u(wR) by deﬁnition of   s(k′). The
remaining non-deviating countries get u(wR). It follows that s′ ∈ B(s′(t + 1)).
(ii) Suppose s′(t + 1) has n − k + 1 deviating countries choosing s′ < s. Deviating
countries get payoﬀ u(wR). The remaining k −1 non-deviating countries get payoﬀ
f(k − 1,s) ≤ u(wR). It follows that s′ ∈ B(s′(t + 1)).
Both in (i) and (ii) there is positive probability that all countries revise their subsidies
and choose s′ at the end of t + 1.
(iii) If   k < k′ countries coordinate on s′ > s with s′ ∈ (  s(k′ − 1),  s(k′)], their payoﬀ
will be f(  k,s′) < u(wR), implying B(s′(t + 1)) = {s}, so that the process will not
exit s(t). Moreover, since   s(k′) increases with k′, the minimum number of experi-
ments needed to exit s(t) ∈ Ek upwards is k′ = k for s < s′ ≤   s(k). Analogously,
less than n − k + 1 countries are not enough to exit states in Ek downwards.
It follows from (i)–(iii) that for any pair s,s′ ∈ E we have:
(A) c(s,s′) = k if s′ > s and   s(k − 1) < s′ ≤   s(k).
(B) c(s,s′) = n − k + 1 if s′ < s and s ∈ Ek.
Therefore, the cost of moving upwards to a state s′ ∈ Ek′
\ sk′−1 increases with k′; i.e. it
is higher the higher the state we want to reach. Instead the cost of moving downwards
from state s ∈ Ek decreases with k; i.e. it is lower the higher the state we intend to leave.
31Step 2: Central states have lower cost trees.
Here we proceed as in the proof of Proposition 3. There will be a slight diﬀerence for the
cases of odd and even n.
We want to show that for all s ∈ E \ I(n), there exists s′ ∈ I(n) such that C(s′) < C(s).
Therefore, states s  ∈ I(n) cannot be stochastically stable.
Case 2.1. Suppose that n is odd.





− 1. Let h be an s-tree of
minimum cost C(s). Note that (A) and (B) above imply that the cheapest way to
connect state s⌈
n














−1. We can now remove from h the transition from
s⌈
n











result is an s⌈
n
2⌉−1-tree with cost strictly lower than C(s), implying that s cannot
be stochastically stable.





. Let h be an s-tree
of minimum cost C(s). Consider s′ ∈ E⌈
n
2⌉, then s > s′. By (A), the cheapest way
to connect s′ to h is with a direct transition to the basin of attraction of s at cost





.19 On the other hand, by (B) we can connect s to s′

















. The result is an s′-tree with cost strictly lower than C(s), implying that
s cannot be stochastically stable.
Case 2.2. The case of even n can be proved analogously with the only diﬀerence that:
states to the left of I(n) can be connected to s
n
2 −1 ∈ I(n) at cost n
2 −1 while the opposite
transition costs n
2 + 1; states to the right of I(n) can be connected to any s ∈ I(n), in
particular also to s
n
2, at cost n
2 while exiting I(n) to the right costs at least n
2 + 1.
Step 3: All s-trees for states in I(n) have the same costs.
Suppose n is odd. Take s,s′ ∈ I(n) = E⌈
n















. Suppose h is an s-tree of
minimum cost C(s). We can construct an s′-tree as we did in Step 2, but the total cost
of the tree will not change. Thus C(s′) ≤ C(s). In fact, there is no way to reduce the








experiments and we have shown so far that moving out of I(n) is even
more costly.




2}. Assume without loss of generality that
s < s′. Suppose h is an s-tree of minimum cost C(s). We can now remove from h the
arrow starting at s′ which must have cost at least n
2 and connect s with a direct transition
to the basin of attraction of s′ with
n
2 (this is possible because s < s′). This results in an
s′-tree of cost no higher than C(s). Thus, C(s′) ≤ C(s). Suppose now h′ is an s′-tree of
minimum cost C(s′). Remove from h′ the arrows starting at s and at s
n
2, at cost at least
n





2 to the basin of attraction of s, both with
n
2 experiments. This results in an s-tree of
cost no higher than C(s′). Thus, C(s) ≤ C(s′). It follows that C(s) = C(s′) for any pair
s,s′ ∈ I(n).
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